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Abstract 
In this paper we show how distributed coarse-grained IT systems in a real-world banking scenario can be 
modelled using domain concepts and languages that are standing on top of formal methods. We further show 
how these methods help to enforce structural security requirements, like firewall placements. In contrast to 
today’s diagrams of IT landscapes, this approach makes use of the full power of formal methods, being at the 
same time completely transparent to the people using it in the scenario. This is what makes this theoretical 
approach applicable in a real-world environment where people are highly sensitive to set-up costs and any 
daily operational overhead. 
Keywords 
Exogenous component coordination, security, algebraic graph transformation, meta-modelling, domain-specific 
language, domain concepts 
Introduction 
The problem addressed in this paper is the question of how to handle structural security issues, like firewall 
placements, of distributed coarse-grained IT components in a decentralised and global banking organisation. 
The concrete case that is used as a representative example is the real-world situation of the Credit Suisse 
Luxembourg, S.A. This case is referred to as “the scenario” in the following. 
The scenario encompasses coarse-grained IT components like databases, applications for portfolio management 
or order processing. It is run by highly skilled technical staff. The average workload is high, and the expertise is 
well focused. Security issues come in as something holistic and cross-functional, driven by internal and external 
stakeholders, limited by given restrictions. Internal stakeholders are, for example, local or headquarter staff 
enforcing their security policies; external stakeholders show up as, for example, government requirements, like 
certain public security standards that must be implemented. Limitations naturally arise because security is cross-
functional to actual competences, skills and experiences. So, for example, mastering database security and 
application security on its own does not necessarily result in a secure distributed system, and having security 
competences in both fields is not realistic for a single expert. It is therefore important to find a solution to help 
people in the scenario to model, build, administrate, monitor and control such a local IT landscape respecting 
given restrictions in terms of security set-up time, daily operational workload and available competences. In this 
sense, the requirements for the solution are derived from the scenario, and the solution itself must prove to be 
helpful in the scenario later on. 
First, from a methodological point of view, the solution proposed in this paper shows how to abstract from the 
scenario using a mathematical model. It further shows how to handle the building blocks of such a model using 
a mathematical method. Therefore, the models as well as the modelling process are both based on mathematics. 
While the coordination model Reo and Abstract Behavior Types (ABTs) are used to model the distributed 
system, algebraic graph transformation is used as technique for generating and editing these models. Second, 
from a practical point of view, this paper presents ways to hide the mathematical issues from the people in the 
scenario. This is done to reduce the set-up cost before being able to apply this approach, as well as to minimise 
the daily operational overhead after implementing the solution in the scenario. 
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Because the internal implementation of components in the scenario is not known, the focus has to be on message 
streams between them. The chosen techniques Reo and ABTs fulfil this requirement, since they allow the 
modelling of exogenous coordination of components by connectors. Because component and connector models 
of distributed systems can be interpreted as graphs, algebraic graph transformation applies ideally for specifying 
complex editing operations controlled by security restrictions. Its mathematical foundation allows a systematic 
and even automatic analysis of possible states in the modelling process, but it also facilitates inherent safeness of 
editing operations, as far as desired. 
In this paper, we first reflect the current industrial practice of how to address the issue. Then we introduce Reo 
and Abstract Behavior Types as the formal building blocks during system modelling and algebraic graph 
transformation as a technique to create system models at the concept level that are in line with structural security 
requirements. We show further how the formal and the concept layer are related and how the first one can be 
derived from the second. 
Current Industrial Practice 
Before presenting our approach, an overview of the current industrial practice is given. This is done to motivate 
the concrete need for a better solution. To do this we present first the actual real-world situation, second we 
present an assumed best practice for it.  
Looking at the real-world environment there is, from our perspective, a significant need for a further scientific 
study regarding the actual industrial situation. Such an insight would enable producers and consumers of 
security products to focus on more holistic and integrated solutions not available and used so far. We claim that 
such solutions would reduce costs beyond today’s limits, extend flexibility and they would be of much higher 
quality as most products the market currently offers. So, not little of today’s consulting, integration, and 
customisation efforts should be reducible. 
We also claim that this has not happened yet because of a lack of theoretical knowledge that causes these 
mentioned practical problems as well as others. Current interests of players, consumers and producers, because 
of the market setting do not let us expect this happening within the market itself. External intervention will be 
needed. Most producers are so cost-driven that no investment into research beyond concrete today’s customer 
requirements is done. And customer requirements are mainly driven by external demands of compliance 
frameworks, not by a genuine interest in security. We therefore claim that this is a fundamental argument for 
public founded research projects that consumers and producers are partnering and co-financing, as in the 
presented case.  
The actual real-world situation is driven by the application of different kinds of compliance frameworks (ISO 
27001:2005, ISO 27002:2007, SOX, CobiT) to existing IT landscapes to enforce certain security requirements. 
Unfortunately, these frameworks do not support a sound interplay. Furthermore, they are applied ex post 
causing late error recognition and thus, resulting in more or less good fixes regarding the security issues of an 
existing IT landscape in a given business context. We claim that these ex post fixes not really solve the 
underlying security problems. They emerged as incremental build-ups over time and were not developed 
methodologically. Because of its overall relevance for society a deeper scientific study beyond what is available 
would be helpful.  
But even without investing much into research a possible best practice solution can be given. It could already be 
realised as a first step towards a better solution. It can further serve as a benchmark for the theoretical solution 
presented later on.  This assumed best practice shows that today’s informal drawings of IT landscapes can be 
much better handled by domain-specific modelling. We will argue that even this state-of-the-art approach 
clearly demonstrates the need for theoretical solutions to be developed, so that practical questions can be treated 
in a more satisfying way. 
As an assumed best practice we propose that in order to model, administrate, monitor and control structural 
security, like firewall placements, of a distributed system, respecting cost and time restrictions as well as 
competence profiles of people available in the scenario, domain-specific modelling should be applied, yielding 
higher abstraction by hiding implementation-specific details to lower levels and, thus, giving people the freedom 
to focus on domain-specific issues only. The domain level in the scenario is clearly the handling of coarse-
grained IT components and their connectors. The underlying assumption is that glue code to connect these 
components can be generated based on high-level domain-specific specifications. In the best case, the 
implementation level does not have to be touched at all by the infrastructure experts in the scenario. 
Seeking efficiency, industry is primarily looking for tools supporting the ongoing work, seldom for pure 
methods. So, computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tools, better meta-CASE tools, are the appropriate 
choice here. Their specific benefit is the separation of concerns: the meta-CASE tool provider is the expert at 
building CASE tool functionality; the people in the scenario are the experts of their domain. This division of 
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labour is missing from CASE tools for fixed modelling languages such as UML and from development 
frameworks for (domain-specific) visual language tools. In the first case, either the provider should be an expert 
of the domain addressed or the domain expert has to encode his terminology into the notions used by the 
modelling language. In the second case, the people in the scenario must become experts in building CASE tools. 
Both is not realistic to be assumed.  
For demonstration purposes MetaEdit+ (Tolvanen 2005, Luoma et al. 2004) is taken to be the meta-CASE tool 
used here. MetaEdit+ is widely accepted and proved its utility in industry. By the help of MetaEdit+ concepts of 
the domain can be defined. Their visual representation is used further on to model a distributed system like the 
one in the scenario. Rules and restrictions of how to combine these visually represented concepts are governing 
structural security issues. Later on, scripts generate the needed glue code. The primary benefit is the one of 
generation, which cuts costs and reduces set-up as well as maintenance time. The secondary benefit is the one of 
consistently applying the defined rules and restrictions during the modelling process, as well as the scripts 
generating the glue code. This yields enforced structural security rules, and constant quality, seen from a 
technical point of view, in the final code.  
However, even though practical, this assumed best practice is still not able to deliver guaranties needed for the 
security issues in the scenario. The main reason for that is a missing mathematical model, which describes the 
handling of syntax and semantics of the used visual and non-visual languages, as well as their interplay. So, no 
proofs can be given. For example, the domain concepts are not suitable for model checking. They lack a 
mathematical foundation. Conflicts between security rules cannot be treated mathematically, because they are 
not defined using any mathematical model. 
The presented approach in this paper addresses these issues. It shows how to save the benefit of domain-specific 
modelling using meta-CASE tools with all mentioned advantages like cost cutting and time savings and 
demonstrates how to apply abstract algebra to build a foundation for proofs that are needed to yield reliable 
security statements later on that are not able to be granted by the application of today’s compliance frameworks. 
Coordination Model 
In this paper we are using Reo (Arbab 2004) as the underlying coordination model, on which the domain-
specific business language resides. Reo emphasises the exogenous coordination of components by glue code and 
thereby directly supports our requirement of treating them as “black boxes”. In contrast to functional, imperative 
and object-oriented models, e. g. Abstract Data Types, Reo does not rely on interface signatures or synchronous 
operation calls, but only on message streams. This definition, however, does not prevent the implementation of, 
for example, interface signatures and several kinds of synchronisation mechanisms on top of the message 
streams. 
Components, Connectors and Channels 
In Reo a system consists of components, which are joined using connectors. These connectors are themselves 
constructed out of simpler connectors and channels. Channels can be seen as the simplest, atomic kind of 
connectors. Connectors are represented as graphs, where edges correspond to channels and their channel ends 
coincide on the nodes. Each channel has exactly two channel ends, each channel end coincides on exactly one 
node and an arbitrary number of channel ends may coincide on each node. For each channel end y we denote by 
ŷ the unique node on which the channel end coincides. For each node N we denote by [N ] the set of channel 
ends coincident on N. Thus, for all nodes N and channel ends y ∈ [N ] we have ŷ = N and for all channel ends y 
we have y ∈ [ŷ]. Figure 1(a) shows an example, where five components C1, … , C5 are connected using various 
connectors. In Figure 1(b) we see how connectors may be reused in systems and other connectors by referencing 
them in the graph. The system has exactly the same topology as the flat system in Figure 1(a), but the 
presentation with connector references and reuses leads to a more concise arrangement. 
     
 (a) Flat system (b) System with connector references 
Figure 1: Examples of Reo systems 
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Channels do not have a direction themselves in Reo, but their ends do. A source end accepts data into the 
channel and a sink end promotes data out of the channel. Channels may have ends with different or identical 
kinds. A channel with two source ends is called drain, while a channel with two sink ends is a spout. In a 
connector, the channel ends [N] coincident on a node N may be partitioned into disjoint sets Snk(N) of sink ends 
and Src(N) of source ends. A node N is called sink node if only sink ends coincide on it (Snk(N) = [N] ≠ {}), 
vice versa it is called source node if only source ends coincide (Src(N) = [N] ≠ {}). In all other cases ([N] = {} 
or (Snk(N) ≠ {} and Src(N) ≠ {})) the node is called mixed node. Components may only be connected to sink or 
source nodes, where they may read from sink nodes and write to source nodes, but they may not be connected to 
mixed nodes.  
Channel types differ in the coordination of writing operations on their source ends and reading operations on 
their sink ends. Note that Reo allows a user-defined set of primitive channel types to be used. Some examples of 
possible channel types are given in the next subsection. 
Primitive Channel Types and Their Composition 
Let us consider the following examples of primitive channel types, where their visual representation is given in 
Figure 2(a). Note that, in contrast to UML and other semi-formal techniques, these visualisations correspond to 
well-defined entities with a precisely given semantics. Sync facilitates synchronous communication: The 
writing of a data element at the source end and the deliverance at the sink end happen simultaneously, i. e. data 
may only flow through the channel if one of the components or channels connected to the source end is ready to 
write and all of the components or channels connected to the sink end are ready to read. SyncDrain has two 
source ends and only allows the writing of data elements on both ends simultaneously. SyncSpout non-
deterministically produces data elements which can be read from both sink ends simultaneously. FIFO1 allows 
the entities at the source end to write data into its buffer and entities at the sink end to read this data element 
from the buffer afterwards. If the buffer is full it must first be emptied through the sink end before another data 
element may be written through the source end. FIFO1(d) is much like FIFO1, but the buffer is initially filled 
with the data element d, which must first be taken through the sink end before the first element can be written to 
the source end. Filter(pat) is a synchronous channel dropping all data items not conforming to the pattern pat. 
     
 (a) Channel types  (b) Alternator (c) Inhibitor 
Figure 2: Channel types and compositions 
One of the most outstanding features of Reo is the possibility to create very complex connectors out of a rather 
small set of primitive channel types. Alternator-example: Let us consider the connector in Figure 2(b). It has 
two source nodes 1 and 2 and a sink node 3. The SyncDrain ensures that data may only be written to the source 
nodes simultaneously. This can only happen if the entities at sink node 3 are ready to read the data item from 
source node 1. Moreover, the buffer of the FIFO1 channel must be empty and therefore ready to accept the data 
item from source node 2. After a write the buffer first has to be emptied by delivering its content to sink node 3 
before another write to nodes 1 and 2 can succeed. Thus, this connector delivers data items from source nodes 1 
and 2 to sink node 3 in a strictly alternating order starting with an item from source node 1. 
Inhibitor-example: The connector in Figure 2(c) allows data to flow synchronously from source node 1 to sink 
node 2 if the upper FIFO1 buffer is filled and the lower FIFO1 buffer is empty. This is possible since the upper 
buffer is filled initially with the data element ‘*’. The SyncDrain synchronises the flow from node 1 to 2 with 
the data item flowing from the upper buffer to the lower buffer. Some time later this item can flow back to the 
upper buffer to enable another flow from source node 1 to sink node 2. If a data item is written to source node 3 
the lower buffer is filled with this element and all future flows through the connector are inhibited, since the two 
FIFO1s mutually block each other. 
Formal Semantics 
Different kinds of formal semantics have been proposed for Reo. Arbab & Rutten (2003) and Arbab (2005) give 
a coalgebraic semantics based on Abstract Behavior Types (ABTs). ABTs are defined as relations between input 
and output ports and are used as the semantic models for components and connectors. The messages flowing 
through these ports are modelled as timed data streams (TDSs) 〈α,a〉, where α is a possibly infinite stream of 
data items and a is a strictly increasing stream of real numbers representing the points in time, at which the 
corresponding data items in a flow through this port. For example, Sync can be modelled as a relation between 
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an input TDS 〈α,a〉 and an output TDS 〈β,b〉 with 〈α,a〉Sync〈β,b〉 ≡ (β = α) ∧( b = a) and FIFO1 can be modelled 
as 〈α,a〉FIFO1〈β,b〉 ≡ (β = α)∧(ai < bi < ai+1 for all positions i in the streams). 
Baier et al. (2006) use constraint automata to specify accepted languages of TDS tuples. The transitions in 
constraint automata are labelled with the names of the ports on which messages are observed simultaneously and 
constraints on the data items in these messages. Constraint automata can also be used to specify requirements 
and provisions of components and connectors. Since they are close to ordinary automata and labelled transition 
systems this semantic foundation of Reo is suitable to provide model-checking techniques.  
Domain-specific Business Language 
The scenario observed in the modelling of the coarse-grained IT infrastructure at Credit Suisse shows that the 
usage of formal techniques like Reo is not practicable in such an environment. In fact, we need a domain-
specific language (DSL) tailored to the skills of IT infrastructure architects. Such a DSL should be close to the 
informal, intuitive drawings used today, so that these users are not coerced into the steep learning curve 
necessary to introduce a formal technique. In order to avoid sacrificing the formal foundation, this DSL should, 
however, have relations to underlying Reo models. An example of a model in such a language can be found in 
Figure 3(a), where illustrative images are used as symbols for components and connectors. In Figure 3(b) the 
underlying Reo model with its connectors and components is given, where the components are depicted in red 
while the connectors are depicted in green. We observe that a single connection in the DSL model corresponds 
to a whole connector in Reo with multiple source and sink nodes for the different directions of bidirectional 
connections. In order to formalise the relation between Reo and the DSL and the manipulation of models in both 
languages we give an introduction to the theory of typed graphs and algebraic graph transformation in the next 
section. 
    
 (a) IT infrastructure in DSL  (b) IT infrastructure in Reo 
Figure 3: DSL model and underlying Reo model 
Typed Graphs and Algebraic Graph Transformation 
In this section we are using the theory of typed graphs and algebraic graph transformation, as it is presented e.g. 
by Ehrig et al. (2006), to define on the one hand a formal relation between Reo and a prototypical domain-
specific language and show on the other hand how to model transformations such as refactorings or automatic 
modifications and translations. Graph transformation was chosen because it has a sound mathematical 
foundation with a long history of research and a wealth of theoretical results. 
Typed Graphs and Language Families 
A graph G=(N,E, src, trg) consists of a set N of nodes and a set E of edges together with functions src, trg:E→N 
assigning to each edge its source and target node. A graph homomorphism h: G→G’ = (hN, hE) consists of two 
functions hN: N →N’ and hE: E→E’, which are compatible with the source and target functions, i.e. src’○hE =hN 
○src and trg’○ hE =hN ○ trg (see Figure 4(a)). Graph homomorphisms may translate, merge and embed nodes 
and edges of the source graph in the target graph. Given a graph TG, called type graph, a typed graph (G,type) 
consists of a graph G and a typing morphism type: G→TG. Hence, every node of G is labelled with a node type 
(a node of TG) and every edge with an edge type (an edge of TG). A typed graph morphism is a homomorphism 
h:G→G’ compatible with the typings, i.e. type’○h = type (see Figure 4(b)). The category of all typed graphs and 
their morphisms for a given type graph TG is denoted by TG(TG). 
  
 (a) Graph homomorphism (b) Typed morphism 
Figure 4: Morphisms for graphs and typed graphs 
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These algebraic notions can be used as a simple formalisation for meta-modelling, where the type graphs are the 
meta-models or schemas defining an abstract syntax for a class of models, represented by the typed graphs as 
instances. Meta-models in the sense of MOF (OMG 2006) are, however, much more expressive than type 
graphs. They can e. g. declare multiplicities, inheritance and attributes of model elements. Some extensions that 
provide similar features for graphs are given by Ehrig et al. (2006). In this paper, however, we will confine 
ourselves to the case of simple typed graphs without additional features.  
As an example of type graphs and typed graphs consider Figure 5. In Figure 5(a) a simple meta-model for Reo is 
given by the type graph TGReo, where node types are defined for Reo nodes, components, connectors and 
channels, and their connections are given by the edge types represented as arrows. In Figure 5(b) the abstract 
syntax of the components PC, BAS and DB and the connector FW from the Reo model in Figure 3(b) is given 
by an instance graph ReoNetDSL ∈ TG(TGReo). We give the typing morphism by annotating the types of nodes and 
edges after a potential identifier and a colon. Note that the connections between these building blocks are not 
formalised in this model, because they will be specified by domain-specific models later on.  
Homomorphisms between type graphs can be used to relate a family of languages of typed graphs. An overview 
of the proposed language family for domain-specific languages based on Reo is given in Figure 6, where also 
the intended users of the different sublanguages are visualised. All arrows are graph homomorphisms, where 
dashed arrows are the typing morphisms between instances and there schemas, while solid arrows are type graph 
and instance morphisms relating Reo and the domain-specific language by “part of ”-relationships. 
 
 
(a) Meta-model TGReo 
 
(b) Reo model ReoNetDSL 
Figure 5: Meta-model for Reo with instance model 
 
 
Figure 6: Language family for distributed systems 
Experts for formal methods, Reo experts in particular, use the language defined by the type graph TGReo to 
create Reo models like ReoNetDSL, but using the visual notion as in Figure 3(b). Independently, technical experts 
define meta-models for domain-specific languages, which are instances of the “meta-meta-model” TGDSL given 
in Figure 7(a). Schemas for domain-specific languages consist of node types for components, connections and 
interfaces. In our example the meta-model TGNetDSL in Figure 7(b) defines a very simple modelling language for 
network infrastructures, which has component types for clients, servers and firewalls and connection types for 
HTTP and database connections; e. g., the component type BeaAS for application servers has interfaces HTSrv 
and DBCln, where HTSrv can be used to connect its instances to some other component with a HTCln interface 
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via a secure or insecure HTTP connection with type Sec or Insec, and DBCln can be connected to a database. 
TGNetDSL serves as a bridge between two language levels: On the one hand it is an instance of the schema TGDSL, 
on the other hand it is itself a schema for the user models, network infrastructures in our example, manipulated 
by domain experts. 
 
  
 (a) Meta-model TGDSL (b) Meta-model TGNetDSL 
Figure 7: Meta-model for DSLs with meta-model for NetDSL 
The domain experts as end users in our scenario can now use the domain-specific language without explicit 
skills in the underlying formalisms. As an example the DSL model UserMod, whose visual representation was 
given in Figure 3(a), is shown as instance of TGNetDSL in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8: Instance model UserMod for IT infrastructure 
The formal and the technical experts work together in creating the mapping from domain-specific types in 
TGDSL-instances to connector definitions in Reo models. These mappings are instances of TGMap shown in Figure 
9(a). The edge types between CompT from TGDSL and Comp and Conn from TGReo are used to assign underlying 
Reo components and connectors to the domain-specific component types. The intermediate node types Link, In 
and Out and the corresponding edge types are used to relate domain-specific interfaces with corresponding 
source and sink nodes in Reo and domain-specific connections with links between these ports. The mapping 
MapNetDSL from the connector, component and connection types of TGNetDSL to the corresponding Reo connectors 
and components as well as source and sink nodes is given in Figure 9(b). For example, the Reo component PC is 
assigned to the domain-specific component type DellPC, which has an interface HTCln consisting of an Out 
node for request and an In node for responses. These nodes are realised by the corresponding Reo nodes of PC, 
but also by Reo nodes of the connector FW, which is assigned to another domain-specific component type 
(CiscoFW) having an HTCln interface. The domain-specific connection type Sec consists of two Links in the 
mapping, one for each direction of the secure HTTP connection. 
  
 (a) Meta-model TGMap (b) Mapping MapNetDSL 
Figure 9: Meta-model for mappings with mapping for NetDSL 
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Such a mapping can be used to facilitate the automatic construction of a complete Reo model from UserMod or 
some other domain-specific model. More precisely, the building blocks from ReoNetDSL are copied for each 
occurrence of a component with corresponding component type and these copies are connected using 
synchronous channels according to the links specified for the connection types in MapNetDSL. This complete Reo 
model can then be model checked or otherwise validated. 
Note that the integrated type graph TGIntegr does not have to be given explicitly to define the relationships 
between Reo and the DSLs. It can rather be constructed as a colimit of the meta-models for Reo, DSL type 
graphs and mappings over their respective common terminologies TerminologyReo and TerminologyDSL. Here, the 
category theoretical notion of “colimit” can be understood as disjoint unions over common parts. Likewise, the 
whole definition NetDSL of our example DSL can be understood as an amalgamation of its constituent parts 
ReoNetDSL, TGNetDSL and MapNetDSL. 
Graph Transformation, Grammars and Refactoring 
Given a type graph TG a transformation rule p = (L←K→R) is defined by three typed graphs L,K,R ∈ TG(TG) 
and two typed graph morphisms l: K→L and r: K→R, where l is injective. The application of a rule p to a host 
graph G by an injective match m: L→G is given by a double-pushout (DPO) as in Figure 10 resulting in a graph 
G’. Such an application is denoted by G ⇒ G’. Intuitively, an application can be described as the removal of all 
elements in L that are not reached from K resulting in the context graph C and the addition of the elements in R 
and not reached from K. If r is non-injective the transformation merges identified elements. A transformation G0 
⇒* Gn is given by a sequence G0 ⇒ … ⇒ Gn of rule applications. 
 
Figure 10: DPO transformations 
Transformation rules may be used as productions in graph grammars. Those grammars are quite similar to 
Chomsky grammars for textual languages; a type graph TG, a start graph S ∈ TG(TG) and a set of productions 
define a language L = {G ∈ TG(TG) | S ⇒* G } of typed graphs. Since in most cases not all instances of a type 
graph are desired as possible models, grammars should be given for all considered model languages in the 
scenario: Reo, the domain-specific type graphs, the mappings between them and the domain-specific languages 
themselves. Grammars can also be used to provide syntax-directed editing, e. g. by using a tool like Tiger (Ehrig 
et al. 2005) which generates visual editors based on graph grammars, where the rules can also be edited in the 
visual notation of the DSL.  
Rules can also be used to define refactorings of typed graphs. A refactoring modifies the structure of a model 
without changing relevant properties, where the choice of “relevance” may vary. If a refactoring is built from 
the productions of a grammar it is guaranteed to produce syntactically correct models. As an example of such a 
rule consider Figure 11, where a domain-specific model is refactored by merging multiple firewalls. The left-
hand and right-hand graphs L and R of the rule are explicitly depicted, while the preserved part K is given by the 
interface nodes 1, 2, 3 and 4 contained in both graphs. 
 
(a) Visual notation 
 
(b) NetDSL instance graphs 
Figure 11: Refactoring rule for domain-specific models 
Moreover, rules may be designed to serve as automatic model transformations. Such rules are applied to a model 
as long as possible using all valid matches. This mechanism is useful for tasks like the translation of models or 
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to perform some cleaning operations, but also to enforce structural patterns. For example, the rule in Figure 12 
protects each application server with a firewall. 
 
(a) Visual notatation 
 
(b) NetDSL instance graphs 
Figure 12: Insertion of a firewall 
Negative Application Conditions and Conflict Detection 
While such model transformations can be used to “clean up” a model and enforce structural requirements ex 
post, it is also possible to prevent the occurrence of forbidden structures in advance by negative application 
conditions (NACs). A NAC prohibits the application of a rule if certain additional structures are found in the 
host graph. More precisely, we claim that security requirements can be modelled by graph constraints on the 
domain-specific model. Due to a general correspondence between graph constraints and application conditions 
(Ehrig et al. 2006) this allows to assure security properties by applying productions with such NACs. 
For example, the editing rule creating insecure connections could be equipped with a NAC prohibiting direct 
connections to application servers, such that the structure repaired by the rule in Figure 12 cannot arise in the 
first place. Such a behaviour is desired in the scenario if production systems are concerned, which shall never be 
in a state that violates security requirements.  
Another benefit of the theory of algebraic graph transformation is the possibility of automatic conflict detection 
based on critical pairs. Critical pairs are minimal situations in which two rules can be applied, such that the 
application of one rule prevents the application of the other one. This may become relevant in the scenario if 
different developers modify the model concurrently and later want to merge their work. If, e. g., one developer 
removes an element that the other one has duplicated, the question arises which operation should precede. The 
main result of the theory is that there is a finite set of critical pairs describing all possibilities for such conflicts. 
At least for some of them sensible resolutions can be designed once and for all on the critical pairs, thereby 
aiding in distributed concurrent development. 
Discussion and Future Work 
The assumed best practice, presented after mentioning the current real-world situation, illustrated how to cut 
down costs and development time by leveraging the level of abstraction using domain-specific modelling 
supported by the tool MetaEdit+. However, the notion of concepts used in MetaEdit+ and similar tools to 
implement such languages is not able to provide a sound basis for formal reasoning. Only productivity gains 
were realised, and quality issues were able to be treated only on a technical level.  
In contrast to that, the approach of using the Reo coordination model and Abstract Behaviour Types as well as 
algebraic graph transformation in addition to a domain-specific language yields to similar productivity gains and 
provides a sound basis for formal reasoning. So, people can use the domain language as intuitively as in the first 
case to model, administrate, monitor and control their environment of distributed coarse-grained IT components. 
And they do get as an additional benefit security guarantees out of applicable formal methods like graph 
transformation or model checking. 
Future work will have to handle the mathematically sound definition of a complete domain-specific language in 
this scenario, like it has been done e. g. for UML state machines and sequence diagrams (Hermann et al. 2006), 
such that its semantics can be defined by a model transformation to underlying formal techniques, e. g. Reo 
which is used in this paper. It will also regard the interaction with model checkers and theorem provers. Model 
checkers should check for such things as tunnelling through a system. Theorem provers should help checking 
the consistency and completeness of security requirements assigned to components and connectors. 
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